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ENFORCEABILITY OF DIVORCE DECREE PROVIDING
FOR RELIGIOUS EDUCATION OF CHILD
Hackett v. Hackett
77 Ohio L. Abs. 98, 146 N.E.2d 477 (1957)
Aff'd, No. 5073, Sixth Dist. Ct. App., May 19, 1958*
A child's non-Catholic mother and her Catholic father executed a
separation agreement awarding custoday to the mother and providing
for the child's attendance at a Catholic school previously approved by
the mother.' Thereafter the mother obtained an uncontested divorce
and the separation agreement was incorporated into the decree, although
not approved by the Court.' The mother entered the child in the
Catholic school where she completed the first grade, but the following
term sent her to public school. The divorced father filed a motion to
show cause why the mother should not be punished for contempt of
court, alleging violation of the decree. The common pleas court for
Lucas county denied the motion, finding the mother not guilty of con-
tempt. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the mother could
not be compelled to send her child to the Catholic school by any means
since the provision of the separation agreement embodied within the
decree was void and the court order incorporating it unenforceable. 3
The judicial attitude controlling this issue is articulated not in terms
of the parties' formalized agreement subsequently incorporated into a
court decree, but rather in the court's reluctance to override constitutional
limitations within the Ohio Bill of Rights and judicial adherance to a
policy that agreements concerning religious training of children are
family matters not justiciable, between the martial parties-before or
after divorce. Since an unwilling parent may not be compelled to act in
matters of religious conscience the formal jural acts of the parties are
disregarded. The result is that a parent loses the right to direct the mode
of religious indoctrination for his child when he loses custody through
the processes of separation and divorce.
The mutual rights to determine the religion of children exist solely
*Motion to certify filed in the Ohio Supreme Court.
1 Prior to marriage the parties had executed an antenuptial agreement pro-
viding that "all children born issue of the marriage shall attend the Catholic school
and be brought up in the Catholic faith."
2 The agreement was incorporated by reference as follows: "[T]hat said
written agreement as to the custody, control, education, religious training and
supervision of said minor child . . . be and the same is hereby adopted . . . as the
decree of this Court as though fully rewritten herein. .. ."
3 Hackett v. Hackett, No. 5073, Sixth Dist. Ct. App. (Judges of the Eighth
District sitting by designation), May 19, 1958, affirming, 77 Ohio L. Abs. 98
146 N.E.2d 477 (1957).
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in the parents while married,4 and this includes the privilege of pre-
scribing sectarian education.5 If marriage is between Catholic and non-
Catholic parties, conformity to church procedure is customary for
sanctioned Catholic marriage. In accordance with Catholic policy, the
non-Catholic party must promise to raise all children in the Catholic
faith alone.' When the marital relation is abandoned or dissolved, the
children's religious status may raise an issue between the parties, and in
keeping with Catholic doctrine one parent may want to perpetuate the
child's religious course. If by agreement the Catholic parent does not
receive custody of the child, a stipulation for religious training may be
provided. Whether the agreement seeks to regulate the raising of the
child in the Catholic faith, or provides for attendance at a Catholic
school, analysis rests upon the same criteria since parochial education by
its very nature imparts religious indoctrination to at least the same degree
as parental supervision alone.7
Upon repudiation of the agreement by an unwilling parent the legal
4While English courts followed the doctrine of "Religio Sequitur Patrem,"
see In re Agar Ellis, L.R. 24- Ch. Div. 317, 13 Eng. Rul. Cas. 30 (1883), equality of
spouses in the United States requires a different approach; see Friedman, Religious
Education of a Child, 29 HARe. L. RaV. 485 (1916). A child who is subject to
parental custody has no independent right to control its own religious upbringing,
Pfeffer, Religion in the Upbringing of Children, 35 B.U.L. REV. 333 (1955); see
Prieto v. St. Alphonsus Convent of Mercy, 52 La. Ann. 631, 27 So. 153 (1900).
5 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
6THE CODEX JURIS CANONICI (1918), a body of law governing the moral
behavior of all Catholics, prescribes that Catholics who marry "outside the Church"
are generally forbidden to partake of the Sacraments (Canon 2375), and states that
"The Church everywhere most severely forbids the contracting of marriage be-
tween two baptized persons of whom one is a Catholic whereas the other is a
member of a heretical or schismatical sect; and if there is danger of perversion
for the Catholic party and the children, the marriage is forbidden also by the
divine law itself" (Canon 1060). Dispensation in mixed-faith marriages is set
forth in part by Canon 14061-"The non-Catholic party shall have given
a guarantee to remove all dangers of perversion from the Catholic party, and
both parties shall have given guarantees to baptize and educate all the children
in the Catholic faith alone. . . ." While not mandatory, resort to formal written
contracts is the general practice. See WHITE, CANONICAL ANTENUPTIAL PROMISES
AND THE CIVIL LAW (1934). Allred, The Legal Status of the Ante-Nuptial Promise
Before Mixed Marriage, 12 JURIST 1 (1952), illustrates several forms currently in
use.
7,,. . . Catholic children are to be educated in schools where not only
nothing contrary to Catholic faith and morals is taught, but rather in schools
where religious and moral training occupy the first place . . . (Canon 1372),"
WOYWOD, THE NEW CANON LAW, UNDER IMPRIMATUR OF MosT REV. FRANCIS J.
SPELLMAN, ARCHB3ISHOP OF NEW YORK AND OTHERS (1940). In Everson v. Board
of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 24 (1947), Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting, obseived:
"Its (the Roman Catholic Church) growth and cohesion, discipline and loyalty,
spring from its schools. Catholic education is the rock on which the whole
structure rests . . ." and stated "I should be surprised if any Catholic would deny
that the parochial school is a vital, if not the most vital, part of the Roman
Catholic Church."
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issue raised is whether a child's religious training can be predetermined
by agreement and subjected to judicial enforcement. The majority of
courts have insisted that any provision of this type is void.' Separation
and divorce apparently divest the non-custodial parent of his religious
influence, and the parent in custody decides religious elements in the
child's life according to individual judgment. The rationale of the de-
cisions rests largely upon the welfare of the child; 9 it would be in-
consistent with well-being to coerce a parent to indoctrinate a child to
any degree in a religion unapproved 'by that parent."0 While most argu-
ments in favor of enforcement are prevalent in non-judicial utterances,'
a minima of cases have enforced these promises via canonical interpreta-
tions and contractual analysis.'" Sounder reasoning in later decisions
apparently overrules any effect these cases would seem to have,' 3 the
conclusion being that a child's religious training may be assured only
through extra-judicial negotiation and by means of efforts to preserve'
the marriage.
8in re Guardianship of Walsh, 114 Cal. App. 2d 82, 249 P.2d 578 (1953);
Stanton v. Stanton, 100 S.E.2d 289 (Ga. 1957); Denton v. James, 107 Kan. 729,
193 Pac. 307 (1920); Brewer v. Cary, 148 Mo. App. 193, 127 S.W. 685 (1910);
Boerger v. Boerger, 26 N.J. Super. 90, 97 A.2d 419 (1953) ; In re Butcher's Estate,
266 Pa. 479, 109 At. 683 (1920); ToRPEY, JUDICIAL DOCTRINES OF RELIGIOUS
RIGHTS IN AMERICA (1948) ; EMERSON AND HABER, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN
THE UNITED STATES 954-956 (1952). See Friedman, supra note 4; Pfeffer, supra
note 4.
OThe welfare rationale is succinctly stated in Stanton v. Stanton, supra
note 8, at 292: "In those jurisdictions which have dealt with the question it is
generally held that the welfare of the child is the controlling fact in determining
the right to its custody, and for this reason contracts between the parents con-
cerning the religious training of their children will not be enforced, and the
parent to whom custody is awarded is not bound by the previous contract." See
also 2 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §583 (2) (1932) ; 67 C.J.S., 646-667 (1950).
10 "The parent to whom custody is awarded must logically and naturally be
the one who lawfully exercises the greater control and influence over the child....
To create a basic religious conflict in the mind of the child, and between it and
its custodian, would be detrimental to its welfare." Boerger v. Boerger, supra note
8, at 104, 97 A.2d at 427.
11 See, e.g., WHITE, CANONICAL ANTENUPTIAL PROMISES AND THE CIVIL LAW
(1934), WHITE, THE LEGAL EFFECT OF ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS IN MIXED
MARRIAGES (1932), MURRAY, Equity and the Antenuptial Contract, 6 CATHOLIC U.L.
REv. 169 (1956), Allred, supra note 6.
12 Shearer v. Shearer, 73 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1947), and Ramon v. Ramon, 34
N.Y.S.2d 100 (1942), stressed the enforceability position. 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§1744a, n. 3 states: ". . . Agreements between parents relating to the religious
training of their children are generally upheld ... ." However the cases cited in
support of the statement refused to enforce the agreements; see criticism in
Pfeffer, supra note 4.
13The New York Court of Appeals in Martin v. Martin, 308 N.Y. 136,
123 N.E.2d 812 (1954), disregarded an antenuptial agreement subsequently in-
corporated into a divorce decree providing for the child to be raised in the
Catholic faith because it would be detrimental to the child's welfare. See Stanton
v. Stanton, supra note 8, which took the same approach.
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Contempt as a -method of enforcement has not often been raised,
for it necessitates incorporation of the agreement into the divorce decree,
which is not always the case. Recently the Supreme Court of Iowa was
confronted with facts parallel to the instant litigation; there the
position regarding the enforceability of a separation agreement incorpo-
Roman Catholic *Religion." 4 The court held that specificity of the
decree was a condition precedent to enforcement and since the quantum
of religious upbringing was ambiguous, the parent could not possibly
know what was required and contempt could not lie. 5 The general
position regarding the enforceability of a separation agreement incorpo-
rated into a divorce decree has been recently asserted by the Ohio Su-
preme Court in Robrock v. Robrock;16 the agreement is superseded by
the decree and enforceable as such. While it was argued that this
holding controls the religious agreement issue, the appellate court in the
present case refused to apply the Robrock reasoning because the religious
promise as such was never legally enforceable. The appellate court em-
phasized that the present decision concerns matters wholly of a religious
nature whereas the Robrock case concerned only secular interests. 7
Because the courts have seized upon other grounds of decision, the
basis for judicial disposition of the issue on the constitutional level has
not been effectively articulated. The common pleas court in the instant
case decided that the judiciary was powerless to enforce the provision of
the divorce decree because the Ohio Constitution forbids compulsion to
support any form of worship and interference with rights of con-
science."8 The analysis is that when a mother sends her child to a
Catholic school she supports the Catholic faith, and forcibly compelling
her to do so would violate the constitutional mandate. Implicit in the
court's reasoning is the supposition that parochial school systems in-
doctrinate the pupil with religious tenets. 9
It is impossible for us to see how the State, through this or any
other court, may employ the strong arm of the law to compel
the mother to act contrary to her conscience in any matter per-
taining to religion. It should be axiomatic that neither con-
34 Lynch v. Uhlenhopp, 78 N.W.2d 491 (Iowa 1956).
15 The facts of the principal case are distinguishable since attendance at a
specific school was provided; cf. :ardin v. Hardin, 65 Ohio L. Abs. 538, 115
N.E.2d 167 (1952).
16 167 Ohio St. 479 (1958).
171bid. In the Robrock case the court enforced a contractual ol~ltgatlon in a
separation agreement, subsequently incorporated into a decree, which provided
for the continuation of insurance and the cost of education for the children beyond
their twenty-first birthday.
1"8OHIo CONSTITTrO, art. 1, §7 "... No person shall be compelled to
attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or maintain any form of worship,
against his consent . . . nor shall any interference with the rights of conscience be
permitted. .. ."
19 See supra, note 7.
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tract nor court order can deprive her of the right to change
her mind where religion is involved.20
While the court of appeals reasserts the constitutional predicate
stressed in the lower court, welfare and policy considerations are viewed
as augmenting this basis, foreclosing any judicial enforcement of this
type of agreement. This conclusion is premised upon the fact that the
agreement was unenforceable at the time if was made and divorce did
not therefore change its stature. The position stated is thus in accord
with the majority of jurisdictions, appraising and adopting the rationale
of those cases which refused enforcement, in terms of the principal
case.
2 1
This precise issue has heretofore not been raised in reported opinions
within this state, except by way of obiter.22 However, it seems incon-
ceivable that judicial enforcement would not ultimately raise the issue of
unconstitutional compulsion and violate the welfare-policy nexus. For
this reason the decisional rationale can easily be extended beyond the
facts of the instant case. The indicia stressed would deny enforcement
to any agreement designed to control religious destiny in general, against
the wishes of the parent in custody. 23
Beyond the restrictions of the Ohio Constitution, the Federal Con-
stitution would seem to provide the most comprehensive barrier to en-
forcing religious indoctrination agreements. By the prohibition of the
20 Hackett v. Hackett, Ohio L. Abs. 98, 103, 146 N.E.2d 477, 482 (1957).
21 The court of appeals approved the reasoning in Jackson v. Jackson, 181
Kan. 1, 309 P.2d 705 (1957) ; Stanton v. Stanton, supra, note 8; Lynch v. Uhlenhopp,
supra note 14; Boerger v. Boerger, supra note 10; People ex rel. Sisson v. Sisson,
271 N.Y. 285, 287, 2 N.E.2d 660 (1936).
2 2 1n re Luck, 10 Ohio Dec. 1 (Prob. 1899), involved the appointment of
a guardian after the death of the Catholic mother and non-Catholic father. The
court held that since the non-Catholic father had raised the child several years
after his wife's death, the child's welfare would best be served in the hands of
his father's non-Catholic relatives. The opinion contains the dictum at 4: "As
between the parties to this marital relation, when the wife was living, the binding
force and inviolability of this compact (antenuptial agreement to raise children
Catholic) would be recognized by all courts, and sanctioned by the moral sense
of all mankind." In a recent case, Angel v. Angel, 2 Ohio Op.2d 136, 74 Ohio
L. Abs. 531, 140 N.E.2d 86 (1956), the common pleas court for Madison county
took an opposite approach from the principal case. There, subsequent to divorce,
a Catholic father who had his child's custody moved the court to change his former
wife's visitation rights each week so that she could not take the child to a
Protestant Church on Sunday. The court denied the motion, quoting the Ohio
custody statutes, Owo REV. ConE §§3109.03 (1953), 3109.04 (1953), 3105.21 (1953),
holding in effect that the rights of the parents are equal after divorce, and that
the court under the above statutes could not prevent any particular form of
worship. The constitutional question was not raised.
23 Dicta in the present case indicate that not only would an agreement to
educate a child in a parochial school be unenforceable, but an agreement to raise
or rear a child in a particular religion (as in the antenuptial agreements) would
raise the same question of unenforceability.
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first amendment as incorporated into the fourteenth in this context,24
neither state nor federal government ". . . can force nor influence a
person to go to or remain away from church against his will or force
him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion."25 This being so,
as regards the individual himself, it follows that this guaranty would
apply with equal strength to teaching children how to worship. Premised
upon these ,bases, under the predicate of Shelly v. Kraemear it would
seem that judicial enforcement by a state court of a promise to indoctri-
nate one's child in a faith repudiated by the parent would be state action
violating the fourteenth amendment."
R. Otto Meetzke
2 4 McColIum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
25 Everson y. Board of Education, supra note 7, at 15. In accord is the
constitutional doctrine that a parent has the right to have its child educated with-
out any religious teachings, McCollum v. Board of Education, supra note 24-.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in the Mcollum case, at 216 noted: "The
sharp confinement of the public schools to secular education was a recognition of
the need of a democratic society to educate its children, insofar as the State
undertook to do so, in an atmosphere free from pressures in a realm in which
pressures are most resisted and where conflicts are most easily and most bitterly
engendered."
26 234 U.S. 1, 3 A.L.R.2d 441 (1948). See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249
(1953); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
271t is settled that the judiciary, as a branch of the state, cannot transgress
the guaranties of the first amendment, for this is state action within the meaning
of the fourteenth amendment. Bridges v. State, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). The con-
stitutional thesis on the federal level is discussed in Lynch v. Uhlenhopp,
supra note 14, and in Pfeffer, supra note 4.
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